Blog @ MoreWhat.com

While reading an article from September 2006 about all the angst generated
over the ABC airing of ‘The Path to 9/11′, the following set of excerpts
from the 911 Commission Report seemed the logical course of action for a post
on the matter.

Like so many issues that find themselves published in the MSM and later spread
around the blogosphere for additional consumption and discussion, there is a
tendency for neglecting the issue or issues after a first run or even subsequent run
through both venues.

Certainly, since Hillary Rodham Clinton wants her time in the White House to
count as experience qualifying her for the Office of President of the United States,
this blog feels compelled to challenge her on that point. If you seriously want your
time in the White House to count then barring the public from viewing your ‘docs’
related to the time in question speaks to your habit of selecting what information
the public is allowed to consider. Early, Senator Clinton, you ‘bristled’ at the mere
mention of the ‘i’ word, aka ‘impeachment’. You claim all manner of involvement
in legislation and Congressional initiatives but you offer no proof. How do you
demonstrate that claimed involvement?

Your only well-known involvement over the years is your failed health care plan
from the 90’s, part of your White House ‘experience’. And your only mention in
the 911 Commission Report in the following excerpts is as an impediment to the
task of ending the terrorist efforts of Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda.

But beyond the case against you as qualified or experienced or in this country’s
best interest as a candidate for President is the additional problem of former
President Bill Clinton and your marriage to him meaning you both would be in
the White House, as well as your continued connection with Sandy Berger and
others in view of the 911 Commission Report excerpts provided suggest that the
previous failures related to protecting this country from the threat of terrorism
may carry the same risk of failure as the last time you and your husband had the
chance to do something about it.

For those of you who may not care for or trust my selection of excerpts and the
paraphrasing of selected paragraphs, you are of course free to obtain your own
copy of the publicly available report and read it yourself. As it is, this post has
become excessively large and is in part responsible for the selection process that
was intended to display items pointing to missed or failed opportunities and the
decision process of the Clinton Administration on terrorism and protecting this
country.

page 108 of the 911 Commission Report

President Bill Clinton’s counterterrorism Presidential Decision Directives
in 1995 (no. 39) and May 1998 (no. 62) reiterated that terrorism was a national
security problem, not just a law enforcement issue. They reinforced the author-
ity of the National Security Council (NSC) to coordinate domestic as well as
foreign counterterrorism efforts, through Richard Clarke and his interagency
Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG). Spotlighting new concerns about
unconventional attacks, these directives assigned tasks to lead agencies but did
not differentiate types of terrorist threats. Thus, while Clarke might prod or push
agencies to act, what actually happened was usually decided at the State Depart-
ment, the Pentagon, the CIA, or the Justice Department. The efforts of these
agencies were sometimes energetic and sometimes effective. Terrorist plots were
disrupted and individual terrorists were captured. But the United States did not,
before 9/11, adopt as a clear strategic objective the elimination of al Qaeda.

from page 109 of the 911 Commission Report

By 1997, officers in the Bin Ladin unit recognized that Bin Ladin was more
than just a financier.They learned that al Qaeda had a military committee that
was planning operations against U.S. interests worldwide and was actively try-
ing to obtain nuclear material. Analysts assigned to the station looked at the
information it had gathered and “found connections everywhere,” including
links to the attacks on U.S. troops in Aden and Somalia in 1992 and 1993 and
to the Manila air plot in the Philippines in 1994–1995.

The Bin Ladin station was already working on plans for offensive opera-
tions against Bin Ladin. These plans were directed at both physical assets and
sources of finance. In the end, plans to identify and attack Bin Ladin’s money
sources did not go forward.

In Afghanistan, the State Department tried to end the civil war that had con-
tinued since the Soviets’ withdrawal. The South Asia bureau believed it might
have a carrot for Afghanistan’s warring factions in a project by the Union Oil
Company of California (UNOCAL) to build a pipeline across the country.
While there was probably never much chance of the pipeline actually being
built, the Afghan desk hoped that the prospect of shared pipeline profits might
lure faction leaders to a conference table. U.S. diplomats did not favor the Tal-
iban over the rival factions. Despite growing concerns, U.S. diplomats were
willing at the time, as one official said, to “give the Taliban a chance.”

Though Secretary Albright made no secret of thinking the Taliban “despi-
cable,” the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Bill Richardson, led a del-
egation to South Asia—including Afghanistan—in April 1998. No U.S. official
of such rank had been to Kabul in decades.Ambassador Richardson went pri-
marily to urge negotiations to end the civil war. In view of Bin Ladin’s recent
public call for all Muslims to kill Americans, Richardson asked the Taliban to
expel Bin Ladin. They answered that they did not know his whereabouts. In
any case, the Taliban said, Bin Ladin was not a threat to the United States.

In sum, in late 1997 and the spring of 1998, the lead U.S. agencies each pur-
sued their own efforts against Bin Ladin.The CIA’s Counterterrorist Center was
developing a plan to capture and remove him from Afghanistan. Parts of the Jus-
tice Department were moving toward indicting Bin Ladin, making possible a
criminal trial in a New York court. Meanwhile,the State Department was focused
more on lessening Indo-Pakistani nuclear tensions, ending the Afghan civil war,
and ameliorating the Taliban’s human rights abuses than on driving out Bin
Ladin. Another key actor, Marine General Anthony Zinni, the commander in
chief of the U.S. Central Command, shared the State Department’s view.

from MoreWhat.com:
After the terror attacks at embassies in Africa and close monitoring of Bin Laden,
intel confirmed he and his associated were responsible and a plan was hatched.

from page 116 of the 911 Commission Report

Debate about what to do settled very soon on one option:Tomahawk cruise
missiles. Months earlier, after cancellation of the covert capture operation,
Clarke had prodded the Pentagon to explore possibilities for military action.
On June 2, General Hugh Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
had directed General Zinni at Central Command to develop a plan, which he
had submitted during the first week of July. Zinni’s planners surely considered
the two previous times the United States had used force to respond to terror-
ism, the 1986 strike on Libya and the 1993 strike against Iraq.They proposed
fir ing Tomahawks against eight terrorist camps in Afghanistan, including Bin
Ladin’s compound at Tarnak Farms.38 After the embassy attacks, the Pentagon
offered this plan to the White House.

The day after the embassy bombings,Tenet brought to a principals meeting
intelligence that terrorist leaders were expected to gather at a camp near
Khowst,Afghanistan, to plan future attacks. According to Berger,Tenet said that
several hundred would attend, including Bin Ladin.The CIA described the area
as effectively a military cantonment, away from civilian population centers and
overwhelmingly populated by jihadists. Clarke remembered sitting next to
Tenet in a White House meeting, asking Tenet “You thinking what I’m think-
ing?” and his nodding “yes.”39 The principals quickly reached a consensus on
attacking the gathering.The strike’s purpose was to kill Bin Ladin and his chief
lieutenants.

from MoreWhat.com:
The plan was executed and failed. President Clinton was in the middle of the
Lewinsky and the ‘I did not have sex with that woman’ scandal. Opponents saw
the strike as a planned distraction away from the scandal. Other attempts to
do something about Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Afghanistan were sought.

from page 124 of the 911 Commission Report

Discussion within the Clinton administration on Afghanistan then concen-
trated on two main alternatives.The first, championed by Riedel and Assistant
Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth, was to undertake a major diplomatic effort
to end the Afghan civil war and install a national unity government.The sec-
ond, favored by Sheehan, Clarke, and the CIA, called for labeling the Taliban a
ter ror ist group and ultimately funneling secret aid to its chief foe, the North-
er n Alliance.This dispute would go back and forth throughout 1999 and ulti-
mately become entangled with debate about enlisting the Northern Alliance
as an ally for covert action.84

Another diplomatic option may have been available: nurtur ing Afghan exile
groups as a possible moderate governing alternative to the Taliban. In late 1999,
Washington provided some support for talks among the leaders of exile Afghan
groups, including the ousted Rome-based King Zahir Shah and Hamid Karzai,
about bolstering anti-Taliban forces inside Afghanistan and linking the
Northern Alliance with Pashtun groups. One U.S. diplomat later told us that
the exile groups were not ready to move forward and that coordinating frac-
tious groups residing in Bonn, Rome, and Cyprus proved extremely difficult.

Frustrated by the Taliban’s resistance, two senior State Department officials
suggested asking the Saudis to offer the Taliban $250 million for Bin Ladin.
Clarke opposed having the United States facilitate a “huge grant to a regime
as heinous as the Taliban” and suggested that the idea might not seem attrac-
tive to either Secretary Albright or First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton—both
critics of the Taliban’s record on women’s rights. The proposal seems to have
quietly died.

paraphrasing following paragraphs:

Sheehan and Clarke wanted the Taliban designated a state sponsor of terror. In
November 1999, UN sanctions were to begin and Clarke wrote to Berger that the
Taliban were up to something. Mullah Omar had no interest in commerce with the
outside world so the sanctions were useless. The US would try tougher sanctions
in 2000.

The US attempted to have Pakistan stop the Taliban from protecting Bin Ladin.
Clinton met with Sharif in July. It was hoped a Musharraf coup might help with
action on Bin Laden. There was no success in dealing with the Taliban or those
in Pakistan.

The CIA was working on a plan to have tribal forces capture Bin Laden. Bin Laden
had taken to moving frequently after the failed missile strikes. US officials
were now concerned about domestic attacks.

There were plenty of suggested scenarios but no one knew what was being planned.
A federal indictment against Bin Laden was unsealed and it contained charges that
included Al-Qaeda conspiring with Iraq as the terrorist would not target the
country and may even cooperate on attacks.

Then there is a currently declassified, yet redacted, report from a Presidential
daily briefing pointing to a likely domestic terror attack including aircraft
being hijacked.

After considering options to protect against or respond after a domestic attack,
another plan to get Bin Laden, this time to kill him, was hatched.

from page 130 of the 911 Commission Report

The CIA reported on December 18 (1999) that Bin Ladin might be traveling to
Kandahar and could be targeted there with cruise missiles. Vessels with Tom-
ahawk cruise missiles were on station in the Arabian Sea, and could fire within
a few hours of receiving target data.
On December 20, intelligence indicated Bin Ladin would be spending the
night at the Haji Habash house, par t of the governor’s residence in Kanda-
har.The chief of the Bin Ladin unit,“Mike,” told us that he promptly briefed
Tenet and his deputy, John Gordon. From the field, the CIA’s Gary Schroen
advised: “Hit him tonight—we may not get another chance.”An urgent tele-
conference of principals was arranged.

The principals considered a cruise missile strike to try to kill Bin Ladin. One
issue they discussed was the potential collateral damage—the number of inno-
cent bystanders who would be killed or wounded. General Zinni predicted a
number well over 200 and was concerned about damage to a nearby mosque.
The senior intelligence officer on the Joint Staff apparently made a different
calculation, estimating half as much collateral damage and not predicting dam-
age to the mosque. By the end of the meeting, the principals decided against
recommending to the President that he order a strike.A few weeks later, in Jan-
uary 1999, Clarke wrote that the principals had thought the intelligence only
half reliable and had worried about killing or injuring perhaps 300 people.
Tenet said he remembered doubts about the reliability of the source and con-
cern about hitting the nearby mosque.“Mike” remembered Tenet telling him
that the military was concerned that a few hours had passed since the last sight-
ing of Bin Ladin and that this persuaded everyone that the chance of failure
was too great.

Some lower-level officials were angry.“Mike” reported to Schroen that he
had been unable to sleep after this decision. “I’m sure we’ll regret not acting
last night,” he wrote, cr iticizing the principals for “worrying that some stray
shrapnel might hit the Habash mosque and ‘offend’ Muslims.” He commented
that they had not shown comparable sensitivity when deciding to bomb Mus-
lims in Iraq. The principals, he said, were “obsessed” with trying to get oth-
ers—Saudis, Pakistanis,Afghan tribals—to “do what we won’t do.” Schroen was
disappointed too.“We should have done it last night,” he wrote.“We may well
come to regret the decision not to go ahead.”119 The Joint Staff ’s deputy direc-
tor for operations agreed, even though he told us that later intelligence
appeared to show that Bin Ladin had left his quarters before the strike would
have occurred. Missing Bin Ladin, he said, “would have caused us a hell of a
problem, but it was a shot we should have taken, and we would have had to
pay the price.”

from MoreWhat.com:
So the next time you want to lay all the blame at the feet of President Bush,
remember there is a wealth of reading material concerning 911 and the events
leading up to it. The Democratic majority in Congress led by White Flag Reid
and No Way Nancy love to proclaim the virtues of the Commissions’ recommendations
but avoid conversations about the Clinton Administration and missed opportunities.
Similarly, Hillary Rodham Clinton espouses all manner of experience related to
her time as First Lady in the White House. Her name is even mentioned in the
Commission’s report. Sadly it is so mentioned in Section 4.5 merely as proof of
her distracting top level officials in their deliberations on what to do and who
will be annoyed. That officials would be concerned about Madeleine Albright’s or
Hillary Clinton’s take on women’s issues while attending to the task of responding
to terrorism is so far out of touch it serves as the general tone of the former
Clinton Administration and no need for another one.

Trackposted to Perri Nelson’s Website, Rosemary’s Thoughts, Adam’s Blog, Right Truth, Stuck On Stupid, Leaning Straight Up, The Bullwinkle Blog, The Amboy Times, Chuck Adkins, Adeline and Hazel, Pursuing Holiness, DragonLady’s World, The World According to Carl, Pirate’s Cove, Blue Star Chronicles, The Pink Flamingo, CommonSenseAmerica, High Desert Wanderer, and Right Voices, thanks to Linkfest Haven Deluxe.

This entry was posted on Monday, November 26th, 2007 at 6:25 pm and is filed under Public Affairs, Terrorism, war, wordpress, Politics, campaign, election, Clinton, Osama bin Laden, United States, hillary, Pelosi, Reid. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. Both comments and pings are currently closed.